Executive Summary
- Taiwan President Lai Ching-te is facing the biggest challenge to his presidency
- So far, with setbacks on both domestic and international fronts.
- At the international level, the widening rift between Washington and Taipei shows that Taiwan cannot secure unconditional support from the US.
Athe domestic level, the Great Recall failed completely, signalling a rejection of Lai’s“Resist China and Protect Taiwan” slogan.
Lai is likely to double down on the “Resist China and Protect Taiwan” message.
As a result, the DPP is likely to face defeat again in the second Great Recall vote on August 23.
Given the domestic political deadlock, Lai must secure a political victory on the international stage. His primary goal, therefore, will be to improve relations with the US.
A defeat for Lai will lower the likelihood of China invading Taiwan.
Analysis
It has been a tough several weeks for Taiwan President Lai Ching-te, who has
faced setbacks on both domestic and international fronts. The Trump administration
denied Lai’s request to transit through New York during his visit to Paraguay. A
report from the Financial Times detailed that the Trump administration blocked Lai’s
stopover to avoid angering Beijing, especially during a critical moment in US-China
trade negotiations. 1 The Lai administration had already arranged for him to give a
speech in New York and attend the Taiwan Technology Fair in Dallas. 2 However,
after the denial from Trump, Lai canceled his US plans and postponed his visit to
Paraguay. The Trump administration’s refusal stands in sharp contrast to the Biden
administration, which allowed Lai to stop over in Hawaii a year ago. Furthermore, the
Trump administration also announced a tariff rate for Taiwan of 20%, higher than the
15% for both South Korea and Japan, which are also major regional competitors for
Taiwan’s economy.3
The recent actions of the Trump administration indicate that the US government
under Trump does not view Taiwan as a key partner. A former Trump administration
official cited several “misdeeds” by the Lai administration to justify Trump’s
indifference toward Taiwan, including aligning too closely with the Democratic Biden
administration, supporting left-leaning policies, and failing to engage Trump after his inauguration. 4
Trump also views Taiwan as a competitor in the semiconductor
industry, accusing Taiwanese firms of taking business from American chipmakers. 5
Additional concerns, such as Taiwan’s low defense spending, have further
contributed to his critical stance.
The Lai administration is pursuing a “blank check” strategy as the guideline of its
foreign policy. It seeks a two-state solution—a position Beijing absolutely cannot
accept. This strategy relies on unconditional support from the United States, which
Lai believes would deter China from invading Taiwan. However, recent developments
suggest that Trump may be unwilling to extend such a blank check to Taipei.
Lai has also suffered a significant setback on the domestic front. On July 26,
Taiwan held the “Great Recall” election, in which 24 KMT legislators and the TPP
mayor of Hsinchu faced impeachment votes. All 25 attempts failed. Although the
DPP’s official position is that the Great Recall was a “citizens’ movement” led by civil
society, evidence suggests that it was initiated by the DPP itself.
In the 2024 election, Lai Ching-te, the DPP candidate and vice president under
incumbent Tsai Ing-wen, won the presidency. However, the DPP failed to secure
control of the Legislative Yuan (LY), allowing the KMT to become the largest party
and creating a split-government situation. One day after the election, Lai, DPP LY
minority leader Ker Chien-ming, and Premier Cho Jung-tai discussed using
impeachment as a means to regain an LY majority. From the outset, the Great Recall
was therefore a whole-of-government effort by the DPP to rewrite the result of the
2024 LY election.
The DPP accused KMT legislators of being “Communist supporters” due to the
KMT’s efforts to build conciliatory cross-Strait relations. It also charged the KMT
with “obstructing the LY” and acting “against the Constitution” amid legislative
deadlock under the divided government. As the July 26 election approached, the
DPP framed the effort as an attempt to “eradicate the KMT.” Rather than impeaching
each KMT legislator for specific misconduct, the DPP cast the Great Recall as a
national referendum on the KMT itself.
As the Lai administration became more involved in mobilizing votes for the Great
Recall, the Great Recall increasingly turned into a referendum on the Lai
administration. In July, weeks before the vote, President Lai launched the “Ten
Speeches to Unite the Country (团结十讲),” using the series as a platform to gather
support for the Great Recall and placing himself at the center of the campaign.
According to polls from MyFormosa, 30% of the public believes that President Lai’s
speeches were intended to “support the Great Recall” and “attack opposition
parties.” 6
The failure of the Great Recall can be interpreted as a public rejection of the Lai
administration’s first-year policies. In particular, dissatisfaction centers on three
areas. First, the public rejects the DPP’s McCarthyist-style political witch hunts.
Second, many believe the DPP is becoming increasingly authoritarian despite its
motto of “Defending Taiwan’s Democracy.” Third, there is a growing demand for a
stronger focus on good governance rather than ideology.
The failure of the Great Recall reflects growing fatigue with the DPP’s “Resist
China and Defend Taiwan (抗中保台)” slogan. For years, the party has relied on
stirring fears of a Beijing invasion as its primary campaign strategy. In 2019,
President Tsai Ing-wen won reelection by branding KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu as “a
representative of China.” After China’s increased aggression toward Taiwan
following Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit, the DPP elevated “Resist China and Defend
Taiwan” to the central pillar of its platform, helping Lai secure the presidency in 2024.
During the Great Recall campaign, the DPP claimed that Chinese infiltration in
Taiwan was severe and warned that “enemies are among us,” urging the public to
root out internal threats to protect Taiwan. The party framed the Great Recall as a
defense of Taiwan’s democracy against China, portraying the KMT and its
supporters as a “fifth column” seeking to undermine Taiwan’s democratic system.
However, the “Resist China and Defend Taiwan” slogan is showing diminishing
returns, as the active search for internal enemies has created deep divisions within
Taiwanese society. Critics argue that the DPP securitizes society to suppress
political opposition, labeling anyone who disagrees with its policies as a “Chinese
Communist Supporter (中共同路人).” This approach alienates centrist voters and
creates powerful adversaries.
In March, the Lai administration deported a Chinese partner of a Taiwanese
citizen who expressed support for the CCP’s National Unification. While some raised
concerns about freedom of speech, most Taiwanese appeared to support the
deportation. However, as the hunt for internal enemies has radicalized, more
individuals have been targeted, leading to growing public frustration with the DPP’s
witch hunts. For example, DPP legislator Kuo Yu-ching accused a Taiwanese man
livestreaming on his phone of “spying for China” and reported him to the police, who
found no evidence of wrongdoing. Kuo’s post drew heavy public criticism, and even
the accused described the DPP’s witch hunt as making society “depressed and
sensitive.” 7
The DPP also created powerful enemies during its witch hunt—namely, fans of
influential entertainers. Many DPP supporters accused Taiwanese entertainers who
profit from the Chinese market of being “Chinese Communist Supporters,” alienating
their fan bases. The criticism of the Taiwanese band Mayday is a notable example.
Days after the Kuo incident, a DPP supporter accused a Mayday fan of being a“Communist Supporter” for photographing a tunnel in Taipei featured in Mayday’s
music video. In addition, days before the July 26 vote, several pro-DPP musicians
released a song that insults Mayday. The music video revealed that the production
was funded by the Ministry of Culture. These actions triggered significant backlash
from Mayday fans, who accused the DPP of witch-hunting and attempting to smear
the band. Many Mayday fans, previously indifferent to the Great Recall, were
mobilized to vote against it in order to punish the DPP.
More importantly, the DPP is not immune to the definition it applies to“Chinese
Communist Supporters.” DPP legislator Shen Pao-yang famously claimed that “all
communication with China is part of United Front efforts.” The DPP uses this
definition as the basis for its witch hunt, accusing anyone with connections to China
of being potential “Chinese Communist Supporters.” However, it was later revealed
that Shen’s father is a businessman operating in China who reportedly has a Chinese
mistress. Similarly, Kuo Yu-ching’s husband is also a businessman operating in
China. This double standard has drawn heavy public criticism and contributed to the
declining effectiveness of the DPP’s “Resist China and Defend Taiwan” slogan.
The public also fears that the DPP is using the threat of China to justify its
increasing authoritarian tendencies. A national poll found that 33% believe a
successful Great Recall would weaken the opposition’s power to oversee the
government, slightly lower than the 34.9% who think it would help Taiwan resist
China. Around 30% of respondents were undecided. The poll indicates that not only
does the public reject the DPP’s narrative, but many also see the Great Recall as a
threat to democratic progress. Additionally, 48.1% believe that if the DPP gains a
Legislative Yuan majority through the Great Recall, it would harm the country,
compared to 36.6% who see it as beneficial. 8
Public concern over democratic backsliding under the Lai administration is well-
founded. Many believe the administration uses government power to crack down on
opposition. When South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law in
2024, labeling political opponents as “communists,” the DPP issued a statement
supporting the move, drawing a parallel between Taiwan’s political situation and
South Korea’s. Given Taiwan’s authoritarian past, any reference to martial law is
highly sensitive, and the statement sparked strong criticism from the opposition.
Many view the statement not as an innocent mistake, as the DPP claims, but as a
reflection of the party’s true stance.
The Lai administration also arrested former TPP leader and presidential
candidate Ko Wen-je on corruption charges without sufficient evidence. While
authorities could not publicly present comprehensive evidence, investigation details
were frequently leaked by pro-DPP media. As a result, many of Ko’s predominantly
young supporters believe the arrest was politically motivated to eliminate a potential
challenger. Additionally, Ker Chien-ming’s suggestion to use the now-abolished
Constitution Article 100—historically used to justify mass arrests during martial
law—to suppress opposition politicians further fueled these fears.
Days before the Great Recall vote, Lai referred to political opponents as “impure”
and vowed to “smash the impure.” Consequently, while Lai sought to mobilize voters
under the banner of “protecting Taiwanese democracy” by invoking fear of China,
many voters turned out to oppose him under the same slogan.
The failure of the Great Recall also reflects widespread public dissatisfaction
with Lai Ching-te’s government performance. Public trust in Lai has dropped to
45.0%, the lowest since his inauguration, while distrust has risen to 43%. Approval of
the Lai administration fell to 44.7%, with disapproval at 46.8%. Premier Cho Jung-
tai’s approval rating is even lower at 37.7%. These figures indicate significant public
unhappiness with the government’s performance. Economic concerns are
particularly prominent. Only 34% of respondents view the economy positively, while
59.6% view it negatively. Among voters without party affiliation, 64.6% believe the
economy is performing poorly. Critics accuse President Lai of prioritizing the Great
Recall campaign over addressing economic issues. Although 68.5% of the public
wanted Lai to address economic policies in his “Ten Speeches,” he largely avoided
the topic and focused instead on promoting the Great Recall agenda.9
The Lai administration’s inadequate response to the natural disaster in southern
Taiwan further intensified public criticism of its governance. In contrast to Lai’s
active efforts during the Great Recall, the administration was notably slow to
respond to the typhoon. A national disaster response center was not established
until July 30—four days after the Great Recall vote. Critics argue this delay signals
that Lai prioritized the recall campaign over disaster relief. As a result, emergency
shelters were insufficient, and in many affected areas, electricity outages lasted over
a week. Even two weeks after the disaster, many residents remained without roofed
housing.
Lai’s personal engagement also appeared lacking. In a widely circulated video,
when an elderly man demanded government help to repair his roof during a post-
disaster inspection, Lai responded, “Go repair the roof yourself.” In another instance,
Lai refused calls to deploy the military for disaster relief, stating the military had
more important duties. Lai’s poor handling of the disaster and the lack of sympathy
drew strong public criticism and further damaged perceptions of his administration’s
competence.
Implication:
“Resist China and Defend Taiwan” has been the central pillar of the DPP’s
strategy, helping secure presidential victories in both 2020 and 2024. However, this
approach now faces challenges on both domestic and international fronts. The Great
Recall loss has sparked dissent within the DPP, prompting calls to rethink the strategy.
Former Vice President Annette Lu outlined eight reasons for the recall’s failure and
urged President Lai to shift focus toward governance and pragmatic cross-Strait
relations. DPP legislator Wang Shih-chien also publicly appealed for the cancellation of
the second phase of the Great Recall voting, scheduled for August 23. Despite these
calls, Lai has chosen to double down on the recall strategy, pledging support for the
upcoming vote. Without significant change, the DPP risks another defeat on August 23,
with internal KMT polls showing high confidence.
Given Lai’s determination to double down on the Great Recall, the domestic
political stalemate is unlikely to change in the near term. The DPP and opposition
parties remain locked in confrontation. A KMT member admitted that regardless of who
wins the upcoming KMT leadership election, the party will maintain a hardline, non-
cooperative stance toward the Lai administration and the DPP. Therefore, any
breakthrough for the Lai administration will need to come from improved relations with
the United States.
Currently, the Lai administration continues negotiations with the Trump
administration to reduce Taiwan’s tariffs to levels comparable with Japan and South
Korea. To secure progress, Taiwan must demonstrate its value to the Trump
administration and be willing to pay a significant price that allows Trump to claim a
domestic political victory. One potential strategy is to substantially increase investment
in the United States, particularly in key sectors of American interest such as
semiconductor manufacturing.
The result of the Great Recall has significant implications for cross-Strait
relations. While Beijing is expected to maintain maximum military pressure in the near
term, the defeat of the Lai administration reduces the likelihood of an actual invasion.
China regards invasion as a last resort, reserved for situations where it believes
Taiwan’s de jure independence is inevitable. Beijing’s greatest concern arises when a
DPP administration can secure both strong international support and broad domestic
consensus for pro-independence policies.
Currently, Beijing perceives that Lai is struggling to maintain domestic consensus
and international backing, leading it to view the threat of Taiwan independence as
diminishing. This perception allows Beijing to shift its focus away from Taiwan toward
domestic economic issues and trade negotiations with the United States.
Lee Yang is a political analyst specializing in the domestic politics of Mainland China and cross-strait relations with Taiwan. His research examines the interplay of ideology, economic policy, and national identity in shaping Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan. With a background in international relations, Lee brings a nuanced perspective to one of the world’s most complex geopolitical landscapes. His writing has appeared in leading academic journals and policy-focused publications, where he strives to clarify the drivers of conflict and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait
1
https://www.ft.com/content/21575bec-5cdd-47ee-9db2-3031c4ea7ca7
2
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/30/world/asia/trump-taiwan-china.html
3
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/further-modifying-the-reciprocal-tariff-rates/
4
https://dominotheory.com/how-taiwan-lost-trump/
5
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBMoPUAeLnY
6
https://my-formosa.com.tw/DOC_217710.htm
7
https://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=1676522&utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=mainpage&
utm_campaign=809
8
https://my-formosa.com.tw/DOC_217710.htm
9
https://my-formosa.com.tw/DOC_217710.htm
